Tradinista

A group with the strange name Tradinista has published a manifesto, and a defense of Catholic “socialism” in three parts (part I, part II, part III). To understand the background of the tradinistas it is helpful to look back at Patrick Deneen’s  2014 essay in The American Conservative, A Catholic Showdown Worth Watching. Deneen argued that the really interesting controversy among American Catholics is not that between “liberals” and “conservatives,” but rather between two sorts of Catholics who could both be termed “conservative” in the conventional sense: firmly believing in Catholic doctrine and staunchly pro-life. On the one hand Deneen put “neoconservatives” such as George Weigel, Richard John Neuhaus, and Michael Novak, who followed the Rev. John Courtney Murray, S.J., in proclaiming the compatibility of Catholicism and liberal democracy. On the other hand he described a group of “radical” Catholics, followers of Alasdair MacIntyre and David L. Schindler. The “radical” Catholics, Deneen writes, “[reject] the view that Catholicism and liberal democracy are fundamentally compatible.”  Liberalism, they claim is not the value-neutral procedural framework that its proponents would have us to believe. Rather it is the political and cultural embodiment of certain substantive philosophical views. Liberalism bases itself on an individualistic view of human beings, in which political and social community of all kinds are formed by voluntary— as it were contractual— agreement of sovereign individuals.  The radical Catholics thus claim that liberalism is fundamentally at odds with Catholicism, which holds rather that human persons are,

by nature relational, social and political creatures; that social units like the family, community and Church are “natural,” not merely the result of individuals contracting temporary arrangements; that liberty is not a condition in which we experience the absence of constraint, but the exercise of self-limitation; and that both the “social” realm and the economic realm must be governed by a thick set of moral norms, above all, self-limitation and virtue.

In response to Deneen, Rusty Reno argued that for all practical intents and purposes there need be no quarrel between the two camps. Michael Hannon (now Frater Urban, O.Praem.)  responded in turn to Reno,  argued that there were indeed practical consequences to the difference: “Traditionalists and neoconservatives don’t just disagree theoretically about where we’ve come from; they disagree practically about where we ought to be going.” Neoconservatives wish to restore the American constitutional order by paring back an over-reaching government, and reversing the legalization of abortion and homosexual “marriage,” and securing religious liberty to enable the Church to flourish. But “traditionalists” think that abortion and the erosion of marriage are merely symptoms of the fundamental flaws of liberalism, that capitalist business is much a threat as over-reaching government, that the bourgeois nuclear family is as unnatural as a political society of 300 millions, and that as for religious liberty, “it could never be enough—and would never work anyway—to have a radically pluralistic citizenry with a religiously indifferent state that merely gives us Catholics space to live out our eccentric faith together in private.”

Note that in Hannon’s response the “radicals” all of the the sudden become “traditionalists.” This requires some explanation. The “radicals” whom Deneen mentions would not consider themselves to be “traditionalists” in the ordinary sense. David Schindler in his masterpiece Heart of the World, Center of the Church rejects traditionalist “integralism” every bit as much as neoconservative liberalism. As Gabriel Sanchez pointed out, “radicals,” who tend to take their bearings from the nouvelle theologie, and “traditionalists” or “integralists,” who tend to look more to earlier magisterial condemnations of liberalism, both oppose liberal individualism, but in slightly different ways.

As I argued at length in my essay “Integralism and Gelasian Dyarchy,” the differences between neoconservatism (or “Whig Thomism”), Catholic radicalism (or “radical Augustinianism”), and traditionalism (or “integralism”) can be understood as being rooted in different understandings of the relation of nature and grace. Neoconservatism separates nature and grace too much, putting too much emphasis on the “autonomy” of the natural order, thus allowing for an affirmation of the secular, liberal state. Catholic radicalism tends to absorb nature too much into grace, leading in the direction of a sort of anarchism that denies the legitimacy of earthly power. But traditionalism, properly understood, preserves both the distinction of nature and grace, and the subordination of the natural to the supernatural, in a way consistent with the perennial Tradition of the Church, which has always affirmed both the distinction of temporal and spiritual power and the subordination of the former to the later.

There is, however, another way of distinguishing the three positions— not in terms of substantive theological disagreement, but in terms of historical and cultural associations and (as it were) aesthetic sensibilities and tastes. If the neoconservative position is associated with a positive affirmation of bourgeois culture, the radical and traditionalist positions attack bourgeois culture from different angles. Traditionalists are rooted in the traditions of aristocratic contempt for the bourgeoisie, whom they saw as destroying the Christian civilization of the Middle Ages and replacing it with the base, oppressive, and mechanical civilization of capitalism, a solvent of all traditional bonds. Their aim was historically the restoration of the old order. Radicals on the other hand, are rooted in the tradition of “radical” intellectual opposition to bourgeois civilization. Their aim was a proletarian revolution against capital. In reality, almost all radical intellectuals were not themselves from the working class, but were members of the bourgeoisie who had rejected the values and culture of their own class, and invented the rather odd and guilt-ridden cultural sensibility of the so-called avant-garde.

Of course, despite their different cultural sensibilities, traditionalists and radicals were united by similar critiques of bourgeois, liberal capitalism. Marx and Engles admit as much in their contemptuous description of “feudal socialism” and “clerical socialism” in ch. III of The Communist Manifesto:

In this way arose feudal Socialism: half lamentation, half lampoon; half an echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty and incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie to the very heart’s core; but always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history. […] In pointing out that their mode of exploitation was different to that of the bourgeoisie, the feudalists forget that they exploited under circumstances and conditions that were quite different and that are now antiquated. […] As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has Clerical Socialism with Feudal Socialism.  Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the State? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.

As I have argued in the past, I think that Marx’s dismissal of “reactionary” socialism was based in part on false presuppositions: on an atheism and egalitarianism that reject any hierarchical order and subordination in society as per se unjust. Nevertheless, Marx was right to point out that the development of technological civilization poses a grave problem for any attempt at reactionary restoration. There is a kind ratchet effect to modern technological developments that render many restorationist projects unrealistic. Hence the attempt of many reactionary socialists to develop new models of society inspired by medieval Christendom, but modified to try to deal with the effects of technological development. Such projects must begin with an understanding of our existing society, and I think that David Pederson has made a good case for the usefulness of Marx’s analysis in understanding technological civilization in order better to combat it.

But, to return to the Tradinistas, in his letter responding to Reno on Deneen, Hannon made the following remark:

My vantage point is obviously limited, but it might surprise some readers to learn that most practicing Catholics I know in my “millennial” generation also tend toward traditionalism. While individually we might have a great deal of respect for some prominent neocon culture warriors, still we think that as a school of thought and a model of public Christianity, they are deeply wrong. From where we’re standing, there seems to be no way forward along the path they’ve charted. I bring this up not to sway undecided readers to our hip, youthful view of things, or some such nonsense, but simply to show that this in-house Catholic dispute isn’t going anywhere anytime soon. On the contrary, it’s just getting started.

Some of these young friend’s of Hannon’s founded The Josias a while back. The Josias has tended to espouse an unabashedly traditionalist, integralist position with its concomitant historical/cultural associations and aesthetic sensibility. Tradinista was founded by a partially overlapping group, but one that seems to represent a new combination. In their positions the Tradinistas espouse many of the theses that flow from an integralist understanding of the relation of nature and grace. Hence the Manifesto insists, “The essence of government is to lead citizens to virtue and societies to the highest of the natural common goods.” And, “Political authority ought to promote the teachings of the Church.” There is no hint of Catholic anarchism here. And yet, in identifying themselves as “socialist” and “leftist” the Tradinistas are embracing the historical associations and cultural sensibilities of Catholic radicalism.

I was involved in The Josias early on, and I have also participated in the discussions of the Tradinistas (discussions recently described by Matthew Schmitz). The Tradinistas allow me to take part in their discussions even though I do not consider myself a socialist or a leftist of any kind, and consequently will not call myself a Tradinista. But I reject their label more for reasons of cultural and historical associations than because of their actual positions. I would quibble with some points of the Manifesto, but for the most part I think it is a solid critique of liberalism. But I will never, ever call myself by a name tarnished by the historical socialist movements, whose most powerful branch was founded on a demonic rebellion against God in the name of a false idol of human dignity (read the preface to Marx’s doctoral dissertation to see a clear statement of the meaning of his “atheism”), and was directly responsible for the killing of millions of innocent persons. Nevertheless, I can understand the thrill that the Tradinistas fill at associated themselves with the forbidden word “socialist,” and their attraction to the stirring rhetoric against the oppression of the poor found in the best socialist writers. Some allowance also has to be made for the fact that they are Americans. America is almost wholly lacking in aristocratic traditions, and it is therefore understandable that some of the Tradinistas see the traditionalist integralists as “LARPers” (to use one of their expressions). I don’t agree with them on that, obviously, but that doesn’t prevent me from finding their discussions helpful. I think it is good to have both The Josias and Tradinista! as the different styles appeal to different audiences, and a Catholic critique of liberalism and its poisonous fruits can thus be more widely extended. If time allows, I shall try to  contribute to both projects in future.

29 thoughts on “Tradinista

  1. I do feel strange as an American (and a Virginian, no less!) pulled toward Josias-style integralism. But I’ve never considered myself to be LARPing before! What a terrific challenge-insult. I wonder, if American integralism is illegitimate in some sense, will Josias and Tradinista together bring forth a legitimate American offspring in the future.

    In the meantime, I will just have to go on not really knowing what I am (politically speaking).

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      • Minor point, but you’re dignifying LARPing too much by putting the word “Tolkien” in the same sentence with it. Look up N.E.R.O. –New England Roleplaying Organization, I think it stands for– and you’ll see images of what LARPing looks like. Fantasy, in nearly all its modern iterations, is a degraded thing that has only the thinnest and highly-superficial connection to Tokien’s world. LARPing has more to do with a more thespian take Dungeons&Dragons than with Tolkien.

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  2. I have problems with the socialist and anarchist Catholic traditions, for exactly the reasons you describe. I confess, though, that I think I’ve imbibed far too much from Chesterton and Belloc to ever accept aristocracy as a remotely desirable basis for social organization. In my readings of history, it’s hard for me to overlook the constant conflict between Church and aristocracy, from local lords stealing monastic property to the constant conflict between Church and aristocratic families over the sacrament of marriage and monastic vocations. The ancien regimes strike me, historically, not as just Catholic regimes, but rather radical usurpations of the power of the Church on behalf of fundamentally anti-Catholic nation-states–and the role played by the aristocracy in the rape and suppression of the Church during the English Reformation needs no elucidation, I hope.

    More than this, though, I confess I see a pretty basic and pretty dire opposition, expressed constantly in history and in the lives of innumerable saints, between the ethos of aristocratic family life and that of the Church–one even bigger, I think, than that between the Church and the bourgeous nuclear family.

    So while I’m on board generally with the theology underlying integralism as you’ve laid it out here and in the past, I find its aristocratic orientation naive at best, very dangerous at worst. Also, I am not a monarchist (for similar reasons). What, precisely, does that make me?

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  3. Only Americans could accuse traditional Integrists of being “LARPers”. Those of us who born and bred in Europe live and breath a society where ancient Christendom hangs in the air and where bits and pieces of it still inform widely held opinions. Tolkien’s idealised rural society of The Shire is based on the very part of England where I come from and when one is there Tolkien’s imagined society seems little more than a rather romanticised version of reality (minus the magic and all that nonsense of course).

    Besides, to be blunt, socialism is incompatible with Catholicism because it opposes all true solidarity by encouraging class enmity and because it breaches the God given right to private property by proposing confiscation and ruinous levels of taxation. Now, both high taxation and requisition of land are both permissible under certain circumstances but those are circumstances which simply do not exist in the modern west. Income inequality is simply not extreme enough.

    This is all quite apart from the obvious problem of the historic association between socialism and anti-Christian violence or the repeated condemnations of socialism by various popes.

    Moreover, to create a workable political movement one must build a coalition. Very few people on the left might be attracted by these ideas, Most are convinced materialists or “progressives” on a never ending quest in search of “liberty” (understood as the absence of constraint on the will of the individual). On the right, on the other hand, one sees a great many people who support the idea of a Christian society and the restoration of a more traditional social order. Presently, most are still under the influence of the New Right cool-aid and believe that if we just had free enough markets and a small enough welfare state then the natural order would be allowed to reassert itself and everything we want to achieve would come to fruition. They are ripe to be converted to a more integrist view point if they can be brought to see that the underlying liberal principals they have subscribed to will never produce the society they want but, on the contrary, will only make matters worse. In short, Thatcher and Reagan wanted to liberalise the economy to create a more conservative society, but history has proved the theory wrong. We only need wake conservatives up to this fact. Any idea that illiberal Catholicism is “socialist” will utterly destroy any chance of converting those people most likely to actually come round to the view.

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  4. I don’t see how Catholic traditionalism can have any political meaning in the United States, a country whose tradition is overwhelmingly Protestant and liberal.

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    • Catholic traditionalism can have political meaning in the United States only after a revolution that requires a return to communal rather than individualistic values. Even the earliest Protestant roots of the U.S. affirmed community to a much greater degree than the rampant narcissism that currently drives our culture. In the meantime, the Church will need another Council to correct what has gone awry among Catholics since Vatican II. Unfortunately, the deepest theological values of Catholicism often do not reach the local churches or define the character of everyday Catholics..

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  5. You have presented a very thorough picture of the Catholic political landscape, Pater, but it does leave a question in my mind. Specifically about the place of Catholic political philosophers such as Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn (or for another example, our late Kaiser Otto). I have my own opinions on this subject, but I should very much like yours in view of this post. As always may God bless you Pater.

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    • I wasn’t trying to give a complete picture. Certainly von Kuehnelt-Leddihn and His Apostolic Majesty were anti-liberal for the most part. I think, however, that they underestimated the dangers of capitalism. Understandably, given the horrors of Central European “Planwirtschaft” etc., but there it is.

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      • Thank you for your reply Pater, it is most helpful. I should just like to note about Ritter von Kuehnelt-Leddihn that as far as I can tell he used the label capitalist for himself in the same way he applied the word liberal to himself, attempting to give to it a genuinely Catholic understanding. His economic views seem certainly more in line with the Church’s teaching than “capitalism” understood as a philosophy of economics. (Also to clarify, even though I consider myself a follower of the Ritter, I would not use the word liberal for myself because of its historical connotations, similarly to how you would not use Socialist.) Also, would you consider either of them (EvK-L and HI&RM Otto) Integralists, or perhaps “Proto-Integralists”?

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  6. Pater Edmund,

    I liked your older post dividing traditionalists from Augustinian radicals from neocons – I find “Augustinian radical” a really useful category, not to dismiss, but to identify a limitation in the thought of a group whose intellectual output is often poetic and attractive. However, when I read this most recent post of yours I feel like a category is missing, at least from a North American perspective.

    There is a group who would agree, at least tacitly, with the Catholic Church’s warnings about capitalism and basic understanding that labor is the basis of economic value, but they are not radical by temperament. They are not socialist, but they do think that civil authorities do have a duty to the common good and that ethnic neighborhoods and institutions have the right to assert their own values and to stand up to outsiders who fail to respect those values. And while clericalism/anti-clericalism is not an issue in the US, this group would be comfortable being led into the civil arena under the standard of a parish priest or bishop.

    These are the ethnic Catholics of American cities who were at one time able to use democratic politics to carve out a space that was not individualistic, but highly moral and communitarian – and very Catholic. And they achieved this not in spite of but because of a modern, industrialized environment that afforded reasonably high wages and cheap urban housing. The key was maintaining social and ethnic cohesion, especially when it came to morals. The Catholic Church in America understood this and supported it, because these people were, so to speak, “their base.”

    Although this system has been effectively demolished by the American elites, it still has a hold on the mind of a lot of American Catholics, but in a way that is mostly unarticulated, and often, frankly, discouraged by authorities who conflate ethnic solidarity with racism.

    And I would guess that the members of this American 4th category would not feel comfortable with the “traditionalist” movement because it is not generally parish-based and does not tend to go through the “proper channels” that are all-important in any ethnic setting. But this may be changing as a new generation of priests enter the parishes.

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    • Matt, that’s a really good point. I agree that my categorization was only partial. The group that you mention is important. It seems to me similar to the “Christian social democrat” parties here in Europe— at least the way those parties were in the post-war period. I have a lot of sympathy for them, but ultimately I think that they underestimate the corrosive effects of modern technological society.

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  8. I wonder, Pater Edmund, what you make of the Tradinitsa’s explicit assumptions of leftist conceptions of identity. Specifically, point #11 in their manifesto makes clear that they take very very seriously the problem of “transphobia” not to mention the usual suspects of homophobia, misogyny and racism – to me a tell-tale sign of their cultural conditioning toward a very Enlightenment based conception of identity rooted in what Peter Berger in his “On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor” would call the successive demystifications of self which result in the “authentic” individual bereft of ancestral, let alone biological constraints. I wonder what they think the implications of a return to no-contraception, no divorce society (another of their stated goals) would look like ? I’ll bet a heck of a lot more patriarchal, rooted in communal/ethnic identity and bound to produce those who would naturally conceive of themselves and their identity in the pre-Enlightenment, natural manner.

    Also, their site also seems to be a direct attack on what one might call reactionary (non-fascist) rightists like yourself when they state in their “Organizing the Christian Left,” that “In the Western world, the main political alternative to the regnant neoliberal order seems to be a reactionary ethnonationalism, which variously depends on neopaganism and white supremacy for its success.”

    Really? Is that the only alternative? And, by the way, what does their opposition (however more subtly justified) of “reactionary enthonationalism” (i.e. contemporary Poland?) reveal about their assumptions toward the necessary ingredients of solidarity? Lastly, ultimately and ironically, the movements they named as potential alternatives to the regnant order are in fact movements the Left anyway, or rooted in movements that destroyed the ancien regime anyway. So why not bring themselves out of the Americanist ghetto and rediscover that political society, let alone theory, needn’t be read through a post-Enlightenment lens.

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    • Certainly their idea of identity is problematic. I do not, however, think that it is fully worked out. They are still discussing it, and I think it could go either way. (Btw, thanks for referring to that Peter Berger essay; I just read it, and it’s really good).

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  9. “So, too, is it a sin for the State not to have care for religion as a something beyond its scope, or as of no practical benefit; or out of the many forms of religion to adopt that one which chimes in with the fancy; for we are bound absolutely to worship God in that way which He has shown to be His will. . . Nothing prevents a political community with a democratic, republican, or mixed form of government from fulfilling its obligations toward the true religion [but] it would be difficult for the United States of America to fulfill those obligations [because] The American Republic . . . does not see itself as ordering itself to the common good of earthly happiness, but rather to securing the God-given rights of its citizens.”

    I come late to the conversation but, having just read your essay on “the Gelasian dyarchy,” I am left feeling that you have not done Father Murray justice. I accept your interpretation of Leo XIII that “the State” has a duty to “recognize the true religion.” But what does that mean? How can a State “sin”? What does it mean for the government of a democracy, a republic, an aristocracy, or a mixed form of government (or anything other than an absolute monarchy) to “recognize” anything? Would it be acceptable for the United States Constitution to remain otherwise intact as long as a proviso was added saying, “The United States recognizes the Catholic Faith as the one, true religion”? Were such a proviso added, would that make it any truer? If 51 out of a 100 citizens vote to recognize the true religion while 49 vote against, does that make the State better than if the 51 simply believed the true religion and 49 did not?

    If your answer to the above is there is something added when a State as a whole recognizes the true faith, rather than just all the individuals, my next question is, what is the “State”? The word itself invokes the fictitious Hobbesian notion of authority as a single, centralized, discrete, monolithic sovereignty, rather than the amorphous plethora of webs of fluid, shifting, overlapping duties, relationships, and associations that arise from the nature of things. The United States is composed of one Federal Government and fifty States, for a total of fifty-one sovereignties in the USA, not counting the semi-autonomous Indian nations. If the States and the Indian nations were to recognize the true religion, would the Federal Government still have a duty to do so?

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    • I think that traditionalist hipsterism has lost even its modest impact. What the democratization of information has brought to surface is precisely a cafeteria traditionalism, self-consciously trendy and naively unaware of its clumsiness, sharply distinct from the grimmer forms of traditionalist dissent (those are ethically more thorough, e.g. even Écône, but not necessarily or usually an institutional traditionalist dissent, simply obtuse communities); a hipster subculture, namely.
      Such ‘manifestos’ are harmless unacknowledged pranks, worthy of an age eager to record every ‘intention’, regardless of how clumsily carried.

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    • I agree that the idea of the “state” has a lot of problems. But it is natural to man to live in a complete community— a community ordered directly to the highest temporal common goods (peace and temporal happiness), and indirectly to his absolutely final end (eternal happiness). (Cf: here and here) There are certainly examples of mixed/republican polities that understood themselves in this way— medieval Italian city states, for example.

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  11. Pater Edmund, I’ve reviewed the two articles you cite in your comment and also your essay on “Integralism.” I still don’t understand how you go from what to me is basically a truism (that it is best to live in a society that is directed to the common good) to the particular condemnation of the United States for not explicitly recognizing the Catholic Faith as the true religion (because of the First Amendment) or to the conclusion that the United States is not directed even to the temporal common good. Perhaps I misread this description from your article above as representing your own view of the United States: “But ‘traditionalists’ think that abortion and the erosion of marriage are merely symptoms of the fundamental flaws of liberalism, that capitalist business is as much a threat as over-reaching government, that the bourgeois nuclear family is as unnatural as a political society of 300 millions, and that as for religious liberty, ‘it could never be enough – and would never work anyway – to have a radically pluralistic citizenry with a religiously indifferent state that merely gives us Catholics space to live out our eccentric faith together in private.’” And, again, in your other article on the “Gelasian Dyarchy,” you single out the United States for criticism: “It would be difficult for the United States of America to fulfill those obligations [of a state to the true religion] [because] The American Republic . . . does not see itself as ordering itself to the common good of earthly happiness, but rather to securing the God-given rights of its citizens.”

    I am not seeing the middle terms. Why can’t the United States still be directed to the temporal common good with our free market system and to our eternal salvation with our First Amendment? It seems to have largely worked over the last 200 years. Adam Smith seems to have had the right recipe for wealth production. Without any government coercion or endorsement, Americans, both Catholics and Protestants, go to church in higher numbers than in most countries in which Catholicism is the official religion. John Locke could look at our system and understand it as arising immediately from his philosophy of man being primarily an individual whose only social obligations arise by contract. You can also understand it as an effective artifice and means to an end, both to the United States’ temporal common good and to Americans’ eternal salvation. Also, in the case of the Federal Government, our social obligations did in fact come about by way of contracts. You don’t need to see First Amendment-style rights as universal human rights for all times and all places. They are something peculiar to, and arising from, the history of the United States. The way our nation came to be was in fact through Lockean-style contracts and the First Amendment was part of the contract as a grand truce between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Should the few Catholics at the Constitutional Convention have refused to sign the Constitution because it did not recognize the Catholic Church as the one true religion? Are we sure Leo XIII was speaking of this situation instead of one in which Catholicism already had precedence? What would his words mean for a minority Catholic country?

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    • I don’t have any particular animus against the United States: I think that all modern Western states are on the wrong track. The problem is that it is assumed that happiness can be left up to individuals; that each individual can seek happiness for himself, and that the state can concern itself only with an external order. But that is to exclude a priori that happiness is a common good, which man naturally seeks politically. First Amendment style prohibitions on establishing religion amount to the declaration that the state can abstract from the final goal of man in framing its laws. But the final goal is the first principle of human action, including political action. Hence Charles de Koninck writes, “When those in whose charge the common good lies do not order it explicitly to God, is society not corrupted at its very root?” And in fact, liberal states always do assume a conception of the final end— a false one.

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